U.S. Takeover of Venezuela Poses Reputation Risk for Russia, Yet Economic Impact Remains Minimal

In May 2025, President Vladimir Putin extended a “warm” welcome to Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro at the Kremlin, wishing him “all the very best” as they signed a strategic partnership agreement. However, since the U.S. apprehended Maduro and announced control over Venezuela—Russia’s close ally in South America—Putin has remained uncharacteristically quiet.

As Maduro faces criminal charges in New York, it appears the Kremlin is adopting a cautious wait-and-see stance towards the Trump administration’s efforts to reinforce its influence in the Western Hemisphere. Analysts suggest that while Maduro’s arrest could tarnish Russia’s image as a dependable ally, the political and economic repercussions for Moscow are likely to be minimal.

“Russia has never held particularly strong positions in Latin America, both diplomatically and militarily,” former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev remarked to The Moscow Times. “Its potential losses in Venezuela would mostly involve [oil] contracts and investments.”

Though Moscow has demanded Maduro’s release, it has not taken significant action to support him following the U.S. operation. It has expressed backing for Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez, condemning what it terms “neocolonial threats and armed aggression from abroad.”

In a similar vein, when U.S. authorities seized a Russian-flagged oil tanker associated with Venezuela in the North Atlantic recently, Moscow criticized Washington for inflaming tensions but did not respond with concrete measures.

“Russian officials and media find themselves in a difficult predicament,” said Alexander Baunov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “There are no directives—nor will there be—to sever ties with Trump. However, they must denounce the aggression against an ally, since the so-called global majority is watching.”

“On the flip side, displaying excessive anger would merely underscore their own impotence: they were unable to assist, prevent, or even delay it,” he added.

Venezuela has remained one of the few nations maintaining friendly relations with Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Concurrently, dialogue between Russia and the U.S. has resumed since Donald Trump returned to power last year, as he seeks to facilitate a peace agreement regarding Ukraine.

“The United States has shown what a ‘special military operation’ looks like. It is undeniable that in Russia, questions will arise: why couldn’t we achieve the same [in Ukraine]?” Baunov noted.

Pro-Kremlin commentators have expressed a mixed reaction to Maduro’s detention, denouncing it as illegal under international law while juxtaposing U.S. achievements with Russia’s unsuccessful attempts to oust Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky in February 2022.

While Putin might face some reputational drawbacks from failing to safeguard an ally, he could potentially leverage Maduro’s capture for his objectives in the Ukraine conflict, Bondarev suggested.

“The U.S. is already signaling its intent to partition the world into spheres of influence,” Bondarev mentioned to The Moscow Times. “Yet, Putin is also pursuing a similar division and aspires for his own sphere of influence. It seems that developments in Venezuela might actually benefit him—he can openly discuss [spheres of influence] with Trump,” Bondarev explained.

“Moreover, new arguments [for Putin’s war in Ukraine] will surface: ‘If Trump is acting without restraint, why can’t we do the same?’”

Experts believe the economic setbacks for Moscow will likely be minimal as well. The Trump administration has made clear to Rodríguez that Caracas must comply with the White House’s prerequisites before being allowed to increase oil production, which is vital for its economy, as reported by ABC News.

One of those conditions is that Venezuela must expel Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba and sever economic connections with them, sources informed ABC. Venezuela is also expected to exclusively collaborate with the U.S. on oil production and prioritize Washington in selling heavy crude, according to three individuals familiar with the U.S. strategy.

Trade figures show that Russia and Venezuela conducted approximately $200 million in exchanges in 2024, compared to $245 billion in trade between Russia and China, as noted by the exiled news outlet Agentstvo.

Russian exports to Venezuela are primarily made up of oil products, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural goods, according to Russian Ambassador Sergei Melik-Bagdasarov.

In 2025, Russia became a crucial supplier of petroleum products needed to dilute Venezuela’s heavy crude following the cessation of U.S. shipments, Bloomberg reported. Caracas also approved extending oil partnerships between state-owned PDVSA and Russia’s Roszarubezhneft to 2041, aimed at a planned investment of around $616 million.

However, Stanislav Mitrakhovich from Russia’s National Energy Security Fund stated that Russia no longer holds significant oil ventures in Venezuela. “In comparison to what existed 10-15 years ago, this is now a relatively modest operation,” Mitrakhovich told the Kommersant business daily. “There may have been some strategic ambitions regarding Russia’s influence in this region, but in terms of economic projects capable of generating substantial revenue, those are no longer present.”

In addition to oil products, Venezuela has acquired armaments from Russia, including portable air defense systems, tanks, and air defense frameworks. Russian imports have mainly comprised agricultural items such as cocoa, coffee, tropical fruits, and alcoholic drinks.

Despite the Trump administration’s assertions that “this is OUR hemisphere,” industrial expert Maxim Khudalov stated in Kommersant that Russia is unlikely to completely withdraw from Latin America. “Given the current state of communications with the Americans, it seems they remain receptive to collaboration, including with [Russia],” Khudalov expressed.

While the exact economic repercussions of Venezuela’s change in leadership for Russia remain uncertain, Baunov also pointed out that the political ramifications for Moscow are similarly ambiguous.

“If Trump successfully orchestrates a regime change not only in Venezuela but also in Iran, Putin will be weakened. Conversely, if [Trump] stumbles or gets ensnared, [Putin] will gain strength. It’s even possible he may find some form of assistance from Putin,” he said.

“The challenge with such American operations is their asymmetry: they are only viable in this manner against weak nations,” he explained.

“Venezuela is an extremely weak country…such actions tend to reinforce the notion that power gives the strong the right to dominate the weak,” Baunov added, emphasizing that for Moscow, “the accumulation of valuable precedents has increased.”