From Assads Ally to Fragmented Influence: Russias Evolving Role in Post-Civil War Syria

In 2017, during the peak of Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, the Russian Defense Ministry erroneously announced that the Syrian rebel figure Abu Mohammed al-Jolani had “lost” an arm due to a Russian airstrike.

By October 2025, this same rebel leader — now holding the Syrian presidency under his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa — was seen shaking hands with President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, fully intact.

Al-Sharaa ascended to power on December 8, 2024, following the overthrow of the long-standing Kremlin ally Bashar al-Assad by his Islamist militant faction, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), effectively ending more than 60 years of Assad family domination.

In the year since the change in leadership, Moscow has had to reassess its relationship with its former ally, which had previously granted it significant leverage in the Middle East.

“Russia has recognized that its influence in Syria no longer matches what it used to be, and it’s prepared to accept this diminished, fragmented presence,” noted Nikita Smagin, an authority on Russia’s Middle Eastern policies, in an interview with The Moscow Times.

Nevertheless, Syria, with its population of 25 million, remains of strategic significance to Russia, both for maintaining its influence in the region and for ensuring military routes to Africa.

HTS continues to be designated as a terrorist organization in Russia, even though the U.S. removed its designation in July 2025.

Nonetheless, Putin engaged in a two-and-a-half-hour conversation with Al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda member, in October, asserting that Russia is always guided by “the needs of the Syrian people.”

Middle East analyst Ruslan Suleymanov highlighted how rapidly Russia has recalibrated its strategy towards Syria.

“Moscow did not maintain that Bashar al-Assad was a legitimately elected president after his ousting, despite Putin having congratulated him on his 2021 election victory,” he remarked.

It seems that Russian authorities established connections with forces loyal to Syria’s new government — either directly or through Turkey — even prior to their complete control over the country.

A significant sign, according to Suleymanov, is that HTS forces refrained from advancing toward Russia’s military installations in Khmeimim and Tartus during their swift campaign against Assad’s troops leading to his removal.

Experts suggest Al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow was motivated by shared interests.

The new Syrian administration aimed for legitimacy and sought access to Russian economic aid, particularly in terms of fuel, diesel, and help with rebuilding the war-torn energy infrastructure.

In July, agreements were made between Moscow and Damascus to reassess all previous contracts, with Russia committing to aid in the reconstruction of Syria’s war-ravaged economy. Russia also continues to print currency for Syria.

From Moscow’s standpoint, accepting a diminished role in Syria was a worthwhile compromise to maintain access to military bases crucial for its operations in Africa, Smagin stipulated.

In 2017, Russia and Syria formalized a 49-year deal allowing Moscow continued access to the Tartus naval base and the Khmeimim airbase through to 2066.

Tartus, established by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and updated in the 2010s, served as Russia’s critical logistical center in the Mediterranean, facilitating the refueling, resupplying, and repair of Russian vessels.

Meanwhile, Khmeimim, which was launched in 2015, became the base for Russian airstrikes against adversaries of Assad and the Islamic State.

However, in early 2025, Syria’s interim government stated that it would only retain Russian military bases if they aligned with the interests of Damascus, leading to the annulment of a 2019 agreement concerning Tartus’ civilian section.

Much of the reportedly private dialogue between Putin and Al-Sharaa centered around the future of these bases, with the Syrian leader assuring their continuation.

Despite this, Suleymanov noted that Russia’s overall military presence in Syria is now seen as “nominal.”

Throughout the Syrian Civil War, which erupted in 2011 and claimed over 300,000 civilian lives, Russia stood as Assad’s primary foreign ally.

Assad has faced accusations from human rights organizations concerning systemic oppression, torture, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

Following his regime’s downfall, Russia granted asylum to Assad and his family, although specifics were not disclosed.

Al-Sharaa has repeatedly urged Moscow to extradite Assad, and in September, Syria’s new administration issued an arrest warrant for him.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on whether Putin and Al-Sharaa discussed Assad’s situation during their October meeting.

Regardless of his future, Assad does not seem to be suffering in his current exile.

Reports indicate that the Assad family began purchasing property in Russia as early as 2013, now owning at least 18 luxury apartments in Moscow. It is also believed that Assad has transferred at least $250 million in cash from Syria to Russian banks, according to the Financial Times.

Approximately 1,200 former Syrian officers are also said to have sought refuge in Russia after Assad’s regime fell. As reported by Reuters, Assad’s ex-military intelligence chief and a relative, both now in exile in Moscow, have been channeling millions of dollars to potential fighters in Syria, hoping to challenge the new government in Damascus and reclaim their former influence.

Suleymanov suggested that the Kremlin has “chosen to overlook Assad,” who is reportedly keeping a low profile, spending hours playing online video games.

“Assad is not giving any interviews, including to Russian state media, and has effectively been kept out of public view,” Suleymanov noted. “What transpired regarding Assad last year represents a personal setback for Putin, who invested considerable effort and resources to support Assad’s regime.”

While both Russia and Syria assert that Moscow “will play a pivotal role in shaping a new Syria,” analysts point out this also aids Damascus in maintaining a balance among other major regional players.

“Turkey, the United States, and Israel are all present in the region. Russia, in some respects, provides balance among these three nations, all of which maintain a military footprint in the area. In this light, stronger ties between Moscow and Syria’s new authorities are mutually advantageous,” Suleymanov remarked.

However, he noted that Russia’s influence in the region has diminished compared to a decade ago, primarily because the Ukraine invasion has diverted its focus and laid bare its strategic errors.

“Putin can no longer effectively support allies or protect them as he did a decade ago when the Kremlin initiated its military operations in Syria,” Suleymanov emphasized, while acknowledging that Syria’s interim leaders still recognize Russia’s ongoing relevance.

According to Smagin, “Russia has managed to adjust its strategy and remains a significant and legitimate player in the region from the perspective of regional states.”