Evolving Drone Warfare: How Low-Cost Technology is Reshaping the Russian Military Strategy in Ukraine

KHERSON REGION, Ukraine — At 11:00 AM, we merge onto the M-14 highway that connects Mykolaiv to Kherson.

“We’re fortunate today,” remarks my guide, local journalist Svitlana Horevaya, gesturing at the overcast, drizzly sky. “It makes it more challenging for Russian drone operators to target us.”

The M-14 has become Kherson’s sole dependable link to the rest of Ukraine. This vital supply line has been under the threat of Russian drones since mid-July, while alternate paths are even more vulnerable to artillery and drone attacks.

“This presents a significant logistical hurdle for Kherson,” Horevaya clarifies. “All essential supplies — including food, humanitarian assistance, and medical resources — travel this route, alongside passenger vehicles. If this road faces intensified fire, the situation could become dire.”

The extensive use of first-person-view (FPV) drones, inexpensive devices created from readily available parts, has reshaped modern combat since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Both sides have widely adopted this technology since 2023, and it has rapidly evolved.

As the destructive capacity of explosive payloads increases and electronic warfare systems adapt accordingly, the most significant change on the battlefield has been in flight range.

The so-called “kill zone,” previously limited to five or ten kilometers, has now expanded to as much as 20, and in some circumstances even 30 or 40 kilometers.

This advancement has profound implications. In recent months, the rear areas of Ukraine have faced increased assaults from Russian drone units.

Since July, Russian forces have managed to partially disrupt supply routes to Kherson — Ukraine’s primary stronghold in the south — as civilian vehicles and supply trucks have been subjected to systematic attacks from FPV drones.

By September, Russian units had mirrored this strategy in the east, targeting the Kharkiv-Sloviansk highway, a crucial logistical route for Ukrainian forces in the Donbas.

Our travel along the M-14 was strategically planned: the risk of attacks intensifies after dusk.

However, the Ukrainians have adapted. Portions of the highway are now shielded by anti-drone nets, improvised from large fishing nets stretched over wooden poles. Another local innovation is the drone traffic light, a detection system that alerts of incoming UAVs and halts drivers until the threat subsides.

The most effective defense remains the electronic warfare and anti-drone defense units positioned along the route. Their presence has significantly decreased the number of destroyed vehicles. Yet, completely securing the entire highway remains unfeasible, and Russian drones continue to take advantage of vulnerable spots.

A part of the challenge stems from Russia’s technological adaptation. In 2024, Moscow began deploying the Molniya, a new type of fixed-wing UAV constructed from basic materials like plywood and aluminum.

Despite its simplistic build, it has proven to be an accurate and formidable weapon capable of targeting locations situated over 30 kilometers away.

These drones are now being heavily used in the Kherson region.

“Molniyas have been observed over the past few days,” said Horevaya. “They are extending their operational range and beginning to strike areas that the standard FPVs can’t reach, closer to the boundary between the Kherson and Mykolaiv regions. This definitely complicates our ability to combat them.”

Russian forces utilize various methods to deploy FPV drones.

Some originate from “motherships” — large multi-rotor hexacopters or octocopters that serve as airborne launch platforms.

Others are transported by Molniya drones or directly launched by operators. The latter approach limits distance but can be enhanced with relay drones.

At times, Russian forces have also employed fiber-optic-controlled drones that are immune to radio jamming.

However, both the Molniya and the drone motherships can function as carriers and relays, significantly extending the operational range of radio-controlled FPV drones, according to Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko.

“This enables FPV drones to be launched 30 to 40 kilometers from the front line, targeting vehicles, troops, or fixed positions,” he explained.

According to Kovalenko, drone motherships are proving especially effective, boosting both flight duration and distance.

This helps clarify the uptick in Russian assaults on Ukrainian supply routes in the south and east. Close to the M03 highway connecting Donetsk and Kharkiv, Russian forces have advanced within the Lyman district, edging closer to one of Ukraine’s main logistical lifelines in the Donbas.

“As the front line shifts nearer to us, so do their drone operators,” notes Yevhenii, a Ukrainian soldier specializing in UAV operations, who prefers to remain anonymous. “The drone mothership can venture much deeper into our territory as well.”

However, Ukraine’s drone units are responding similarly.

“We exploit the same vulnerabilities as the Russians — we also conduct operations dozens of kilometers into their lines. It’s certainly not a one-sided contest,” Yevhenii states.

Kyiv has developed interceptor drones capable of downing enemy UAVs, along with its own motherships and fixed-wing variants of the Molniya. These technologies have been effective enough to prompt Russia to start creating similar systems.

Kovalenko describes these approaches as «active defense» — targeting drone launch platforms and operators before they can carry out strikes.

“In addition to intercepting drones whenever possible, striking their launch sites is a potent method of active defense. Tracking down drone operators and diminishing their numbers is crucial,» he mentions.

On the eastern front, the dynamics of power fluctuate significantly.

“Our Russian counterparts are just as capable as we are,” says Yevhenii, “but they possess far more personnel and resources.”

The disparity is particularly pronounced in the Dnipropetrovsk region, where he is stationed.

“As my senior comrade put it, it’s a bloodbath. When the weather is favorable, both sides are continuously deploying drones. If an enemy reconnaissance drone appears, we might deploy a single interceptor, while they launch three or four kamikaze drones simultaneously.”

Kovalenko believes this imbalance is confined to that section of the front, where the Russians have amassed four combined-arms armies in addition to an army corps with motorized rifle regiments and reserves — approximately 100,000 troops.

“We have considerably fewer personnel in this region,” he shares. “It’s a highly challenging area for us.”

Facing ongoing manpower shortages, Ukraine has concentrated on enhancing unmanned systems to preserve the lives of its soldiers.

While Kyiv still holds an advantage in drone utilization, Russia is rapidly closing the gap.

“In March and April 2024, they were operating around 250 FPV drones daily. Now, they’re deploying between 1,000 to 1,200 each day — and sometimes even more,” Kovalenko reports. “In August, they set a record, utilizing around 30,000 FPV drones in a single month. That’s five to six times more than the previous year.”

Russia can launch between 4,500 and 8,000 FPV drones weekly, often dependent on weather or supply limitations.

Moscow continues to depend heavily on Chinese imports of dual-use products, Kovalenko noted, encompassing both finished drones and essential spare parts.

In August, Ukrainian engineer and communications specialist Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported that footage recovered from a downed Russian Gerbera strike drone contained video files from a Chinese factory’s camera tests.

The interface suggested the drone could employ “machine vision” to autonomously identify vehicles — indicative of rapidly advancing automation.

Kovalenko observes that the Russians lack adequate capacity to produce drones independently of Chinese assistance. However, while Ukraine initially turned to FPV drones to mitigate its manpower disadvantage, Russia’s accelerated production could soon diminish that edge.

“If the current trend continues, Russia could achieve parity with our forces in FPV drone usage by the end of this year,” he warns.