Belarus: Between Dictatorship and Democracy, a Struggle for Sovereignty

When Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya discusses Belarus today, she emphasizes an important distinction: “We cannot speak of Belarus as a singular entity—we must differentiate the [Alexander] Lukashenko regime from the Belarusian populace.”

Five years after being compelled to flee the country following her participation in the 2020 presidential elections, a candidacy that triggered unprecedented pro-democracy protests, Tsikhanouskaya remains a vocal opponent of Lukashenko’s government, now operating from Lithuania.

In a conversation with The Moscow Times, she expresses concern that, given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the presence of Russian troops and nuclear weapons in Belarus, and ongoing tensions at Europe’s borders, the West can no longer overlook Belarus — as this neglect jeopardizes its security.

Tsikhanouskaya is also focused on highlighting the ongoing repression in Belarus. While Minsk has released several political prisoners this year, including her husband, the opposition leader Siarhei Tsikhanouski, the human rights organization Viasna reports that at least 1,240 individuals are still imprisoned.

Despite what she terms “Stalinist-level repression,” Tsikhanouskaya asserts that resistance continues, both within Belarus and among the many Belarusians living in exile.

The Moscow Times: What is your perspective on Belarus-Russia relations in 2025?

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya: At this moment, we cannot consider Belarus as a cohesive entity; we must separate the Lukashenko regime from the Belarusian people, as the regime is entirely subservient to Putin. Their relationship is symbiotic; they both require each other and utilize one another’s strengths. Lukashenko provides a cheap alliance to Putin in exchange for some political backing and minor economic support, while also offering territory and infrastructure beneficial to Russia.

Regarding the Belarusian populace, particularly following the onset of the war in Ukraine, there’s been a clear geopolitical shift towards Europe. It has become evident that Belarusians do not identify with Russians, contrary to what the Belarusian state media has perpetuated. We do not share the same imperial ambitions and struggle to comprehend how anyone could engage in warfare against their neighbors. Russia, or at least its leadership, seems intent on annexing more countries and creating satellite states, seeking to ensure that neighboring leaders resemble Lukashenko — compliant allies who do not act in the interest of their own nations.

This dynamic has led to internal opposition among Belarusians, both domestically and internationally, against this integration since Lukashenko is effectively trading away our sovereignty and independence for his personal power. Without Putin’s support, he would likely collapse within days. It’s crucial to recognize that the ongoing russification of Belarus does not benefit the nation or its identity but serves as a mechanism to subjugate it. There’s a real possibility that, through Lukashenko’s loyalty, Belarus could be entirely absorbed by Russia economically, politically, and in terms of media influence — a scenario we are beginning to witness.

How do Belarusians perceive the process of integration?

The repression in Belarus is so severe that public discussion is virtually nonexistent. At present, if you oppose Lukashenko or the war in Ukraine, you risk facing lengthy prison sentences. The level of repression is unequivocally Stalinist. Regrettably, many Belarusians are currently operating in a «safe mode,» engaging in underground activities since anti-Russian content is strictly prohibited in the media. However, through conversations with fellow Belarusians, it’s clear they recognize the atrocities committed by Lukashenko in compromising Belarusian sovereignty. Discussions with officials indicate a growing discontent — they perceive that Lukashenko has gone too far in surrendering the nation’s independence. While some officials still view him as the «father of Belarus,» believing the country is dependent on him, even they acknowledge that independence must be prioritized and cannot be jeopardized by Russian interests.

For instance, there are reports that Russia is planning to establish a major military production facility in Belarus, shared by those with relevant insight. This awareness drives a collective effort to defend sovereignty among certain individuals. Yet, if a journalist were to approach the public on the streets of Belarus to inquire about their views, most would likely remain silent due to the risk of imprisonment for expressing their true opinions.

Ukrainian intelligence has recently revealed new Russian strategies to exploit Belarus for military objectives. How would you evaluate Belarus’s involvement in the war at this time?

It is essential to recognize that Belarus represents both a regime and its people; these two cannot be conflated. The Lukashenko government bears complete responsibility for its role in the aggression against Ukraine, but the absence of Belarusian troops in the conflict is attributed to the attitude of the Belarusian people, who do not view this war as justifiable.

Lukashenko is deeply enmeshed in this conflict, assisting Russia in circumventing the sanctions imposed due to the war. He has facilitated the acquisition of microchips that Russia is prohibited from obtaining. Additionally, approximately 290 Belarusian enterprises have shifted their production lines from consumer goods to military supplies, providing critical components that support the Russian war effort. These actions render Lukashenko a war criminal.

The pro-Ukrainian sentiment among Belarusians is robust. People recognize the war’s injustice, and it has taken them by surprise. In terms of domestic politics, Lukashenko’s narrative—that he has shielded Belarusians from war—has lost its credibility. Many now view him as the individual responsible for dragging Belarus into the conflict. The increasing collaboration between Belarus and Russia poses a growing threat, even to NATO nations, as drones launch from Belarusian territories into Poland and the Lithuania-Belarus border sees frequent smuggling incidents. Such provocations seldom occur without the sanction of higher authorities. I anticipate more provocations, as Russia, with Lukashenko’s support, tests NATO’s resolve and response capabilities. Lukashenko will serve Putin’s interests, utilizing Belarusian territory and resources as needed.

You frequently highlight the importance of recognizing Belarus’s role in the broader context of European security. Do you believe that European leaders and nations grasp this issue fully?

That’s precisely why we engage with various politicians—so they comprehend this crucial point and incorporate it into their strategic thinking for Europe’s future. Too often, Belarus is viewed solely through a humanitarian lens: political prisoners, oppression, the need to free individuals from prison—as if that’s the entire picture. However, the context shifted drastically following Russia’s attack on Ukraine. It’s now evident that Belarus, or more accurately, the Belarusian regime, is complicit in this conflict.

Returning to the issue at hand, all these provocations along the Polish and Lithuanian borders are emanating from Belarusian territory. Consequently, we continually remind our allies not to underestimate Belarus. Yes, freeing political prisoners is vital, but we must also consider the larger implications. Europe will not achieve genuine safety as long as provocations persist, nuclear arms remain stationed in Belarus, and unidentified objects traverse borders, later dismissed as mere accidents. These circumstances force neighboring countries to redirect attention and resources toward border security at the expense of supporting Ukraine or bolstering national defense. This constant state of tension only drains Western resources and focus, a situation that will continue as long as Lukashenko’s regime persists in Belarus.

The deployment of nuclear arms in Belarus itself acts as a provocation. Should the prospect of using nuclear weapons arise, they would likely be launched from Belarusian soil. There are numerous facets to consider. Discussions about fatigue in Europe are growing; the war has dragged on, and there appears to be a similar fatigue towards Belarus. However, this conflict could soon reach Europe’s threshold if Belarus is not liberated and if Ukraine does not secure victory.

Dictators possess a specific mentality: they often proclaim, ‘we can endure longer than them.’ In democracies, leadership changes, while dictators merely wait. They have the means to sacrifice lives and continue manufacturing weapons. Should a less determined Western leader assume office, Putin will be poised to exploit that opportunity and inch closer to Europe.

It’s vital to recognize that this conflict is not a conventional war akin to World War II — with tanks and aircraft — but rather a hybrid conflict. When we discuss weapons, it’s not limited to drones; it encompasses an informational warfare aspect as well. I increasingly discern how the ideologies of democratic societies are being tainted by propaganda. It’s easy to yield to the narrative that ‘you shouldn’t worry about Ukraine or Belarus; simply enjoy your comfortable existence.’ People yearn for straightforward answers to complex dilemmas, which weakens critical thinking. Yet if aid is not extended to Ukraine and Belarus now, you may find yourself next in line. This is why we urge politicians — because the strategic significance of Belarus for European security cannot be overlooked.

I would also like to inquire about the seemingly growing closeness—at least outwardly—between Lukashenko and the United States. Have the interactions of the Belarusian opposition with Washington shifted in this regard?

Firstly, it’s important to acknowledge that many political prisoners were released, including my husband Siarhei, thanks to the diplomatic efforts of Donald Trump. This came about due to the contributions of both President Trump and his administration. We are genuinely appreciative of this, as it transcends mere politics; it’s about the lives of thousands.

Nevertheless, we must make it clear—to our American partners—that Lukashenko continues to be a dictator who holds thousands hostage. While he may release a handful, he simultaneously incarcerates hundreds more. He leverages human lives as bargaining tools, seeking concessions and recognition. This shows a blatant disregard for humanity, perfectly aligning with the essence of a dictator.

For Lukashenko, maintaining a facade of dialogue with the United States is vital. He longs for recognition and to regain acceptance in the West. In past instances, he has successfully restored a semblance of normalcy following the 2006 and 2010 elections, but the current situation is markedly different. Following Russia’s full-scale aggression in Ukraine, he stands no genuine chance of regaining legitimacy. Both the EU and the US, along with Canada and the UK, have officially declared him illegitimate after both the 2020 and 2025 elections. He has become a pariah, a war criminal. It is crucial to understand that any meeting, phone call, or written communication involving Lukashenko should not be construed as recognition — it is merely a tool for exerting pressure. Such interactions do not confer him legitimacy, but he will exploit even the slightest hint of dialogue to project strength. For him, this represents a public relations opportunity.

Moreover, we are acutely aware of the manipulative tactics Lukashenko is employing: by securing the release of a few prisoners, he aims to advocate for the lifting or relaxation of U.S. sanctions. He will subsequently use this reduction in pressure as leverage in negotiations with the European Union, suggesting, ‘Look, we’re engaging with the Americans; perhaps it’s time for you to follow suit.’ We can clearly observe these signals. Lukashenko’s representatives and sympathizers in Europe propagate these narratives — advocating a return to ‘business as usual.’ However, I sense that there is little appetite for this within Europe, and I am thankful for that.

The West holds a much clearer understanding of who Lukashenko is now. The EU’s firm and principled stance is instrumental in this regard. We must support any humanitarian initiatives targeted at releasing individuals, but we stress that these initiatives should serve merely as a starting point. Real change necessitates the liberation of all political prisoners, an end to torture and repression, restoration of the rule of law, and the organization of fresh elections.

You have raised concerns regarding the documentation for Belarusians who fled and mentioned that nearly half a million could soon lack valid identification. Has there been any development concerning the new Belarusian passport initiative, and do Western partners grasp the urgency of this issue?

In practice, the situation regarding the legalization and documentation of Belarusians could escalate significantly. Since 2020, we have endeavored to resolve issues faced by Belarusians abroad as they arise. This has become especially pressing following the regime’s prohibition against its embassies from renewing or exchanging Belarusian passports, leaving many individuals without valid documentation. Basic actions — such as opening a bank account or obtaining a visa — have become virtually impossible.

Initially, we began discussions with various nations to identify a legally sound solution allowing Belarusians to acquire documents locally without a passport. Many countries, including Lithuania, Poland, Denmark, and Germany, are now addressing this issue. While methods may vary, the problem is slowly being resolved. However, this progress is not yet widespread, and many passports are set to expire soon.

As a result, we proposed a comprehensive solution. We crafted our own document as part of this initiative, which is aimed particularly at European Union countries. The approach appears promising because this document adheres to all ICAO [the International Civil Aviation Organization] standards. However, it requires political will for acceptance. When we termed it the “passport of the New Belarus,” we intended it as a form of identification. It does not replace residence permits, nor does it negate the need for individuals to legalize their status in their respective countries. It serves as an additional ID for individuals undergoing checks.

There is also a bit of a dilemma here. Individuals interested in obtaining this document will have to wait for its legal recognition. Currently, our European partners do not perceive a robust demand for this document, yet the issue could intensify. We are currently conveying to Belarusians that to advance the recognition process, there must be a substantial number of applicants. We must also contend with propaganda that claims anyone acquiring these passports will be branded extremists or terrorists, facing retaliation against their property or relatives. It’s clear that passport initiatives are sensitive matters for the regime. However, this could transform into a pressure point for the regime to reconsider its arbitrary decision against issuing passports abroad.

Belarusians are facing numerous restrictions. We have prepared a document in collaboration with the Luxembourg parliament titled the “Luxembourg Solutions,” which outlines various challenges for Belarusians abroad and potential resolutions. In other words, we are actively addressing these issues and striving not to leave Belarusians in distress.