Russian Mercenaries in Africa Create Legal Quagmire for Arms Control – Report

A recent report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) indicates that nations supplying arms to countries where Russian private military companies (PMCs) operate may be violating international arms control agreements.

This report underscores a significant weakness in global arms oversight systems, highlighting the difficulty in distinguishing between PMCs and national armed forces, as well as the overlap between organized crime and conflict.

According to GI-TOC, this oversight loophole enables mercenaries to acquire weapons that were meant for specific clients, which they then use to perpetrate war crimes.

The Wagner Group has faced allegations of numerous atrocities, including massacres, torture, and sexual violence against civilians following its initial deployment in Mali at the request of the ruling military junta. They have also been accused of plundering communities and extorting from lucrative sectors such as gold mining.

After Wagner’s involvement, civilian deaths in Mali reportedly doubled from 2021 to 2024 compared to previous years.

Initial reports indicated that Russian mercenaries arrived in Mali without adequate equipment. However, GI-TOC’s investigation, which included open-source images and interviews with local sources, revealed that the Wagner Group obtained weapons by engaging in combat and pilfering from the stockpiles of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa).

This strategy allowed Wagner to operate more covertly and collaborate closely with FAMa while also conserving costs for Moscow, as noted by Julia Stanyard, a senior analyst at GI-TOC, in an interview with The Moscow Times.

«They effectively increased Russia’s influence in Africa with a minimal contingent of troops and resources,» she explained. «This approach also indicates that they do not conduct operations in the same manner as other international players.»

The equipment utilized by Wagner includes armored vehicles from China, the UAE, Nigeria, and France; vehicle-mounted armaments sourced from China; and there are even reports of Turkish Bayraktar drones being seen at Wagner facilities.

The Turkish Ministry of Defense has stated that any allegations concerning third-party use of Bayraktar drones that lack «official statements or concrete evidence» should not be taken seriously.

Researchers suggest that the acquisition of this weaponry could violate the Arms Trade Treaty, which mandates that arms exporters and their clients implement measures to ensure their weapons are not used against civilians or in the commission of war crimes.

Mali, China, Nigeria, and France are signatories to this treaty, while the UAE and Turkey have not ratified it, relying instead on their own domestic arms control practices to oversee arms exports.

Many of the arms transfers occurred prior to Wagner’s entry into Mali. Nonetheless, equipment was sold by China, Turkey, and the UAE after Wagner’s deployment, coinciding with emerging evidence of captured weapons being used.

GI-TOC researchers contend that sufficient information was publicly available at the time of these sales to suggest that exporters could have «reasonably assessed» the risk of their products being used by mercenaries.

In June 2025, Wagner announced its withdrawal from Mali after declaring that it had «completed its mission,» subsequently being replaced by the Africa Corps, which operates under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

This transition allows the Kremlin to maintain tighter control over this lucrative fighting force while preserving its personnel; 70-80% of Africa Corps members previously served in the Wagner Group.

The report concluded that it is too early to determine how extensively the Africa Corps has appropriated arms provided to FAMa.

The new group has deployed several armored vehicles and aircraft that were delivered to Mali by Russia in 2025.

It remains unclear whether this equipment was designated for the mercenary group or for FAMa.