Past Patterns: How Russias History of Broken Peace Deals Shapes Ukraines Future

U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent diplomatic efforts with both Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky have yet to bridge the significant divide between the two nations’ peace negotiations.

Even in the event of a lasting peace agreement, Kyiv is disheartened by another reality: a review of Russia’s historical peace agreements reveals a series of broken promises.

Ukraine’s apprehension stems from a belief that, without sufficient security assurances from Western allies, Russia might launch another invasion.

Experts consulted by The Moscow Times have indicated that any peace deal reached would be met with skepticism, given Russia’s track record of ignoring or outright breaching the terms of its agreements.

Russia’s controversial approach to peace deals can be traced back to the turbulent period following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In the winter of 1991, when the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria declared independence, Moscow faced a crisis in the strategically significant North Caucasus. After three years of unsuccessful covert efforts to suppress the separatist movement, President Boris Yeltsin ordered military action to quell the insurgents.

Marat Ilyasov, a professor at Holy Cross College and an authority on the Chechen wars, argues that it was during this conflict that Russia introduced the harsh tactic of eliminating perceived security threats, a strategy that is evident in its current war in Ukraine.

“In the same way Russia annexed territories from Georgia, they have done the same with Ukraine, but it all traces back to the initial events in Chechnya,” he stated in an interview with The Moscow Times.

Ilyasov was in Chechnya during the 1990s as the region’s capital, Grozny, faced extensive bombardment and the deployment of 40,000 troops to “restore constitutional order, law, and peace in the Chechen republic.”

The two-year conflict resulted in over 50,000 deaths, predominantly civilian casualties.

The conclusion of the First Chechen War is marked by two key agreements: the 1996 Khasavyurt Accords and the 1997 Russia-Chechnya Peace Treaty.

These agreements emphasized that disputes should not be resolved through violence, with the first document explicitly forbidding the use of «armed force or the threat thereof in addressing all issues.»

Initially, it seemed that these accords could address the primary disputes. However, the question of Chechnya’s independence remained unresolved, and three years later, under newly inaugurated Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Russia launched another invasion, citing terrorism as justification for its actions in the region.

Ilyasov noted that the 1999 invasion, which initiated the Second Chechen War, was a clear violation of the previous peace accords.

“Russia definitely breached the terms of the peace agreements,” Ilyasov shared with The Moscow Times. “While there were security concerns, they were manageable, and certainly did not warrant a second war.”

Rather than negotiating with the existing government, the Kremlin initiated a prolonged offensive that resulted in more casualties and ultimately led to the Kadyrov family, which is aligned with Moscow, rising to power in Chechnya.

Ilyasov emphasizes that Chechnya’s experience illustrates an essential truth: if Moscow views a region as a threat to its security, no agreement will prevent it from invading again.

“If they are focused on preserving their current state, there is nothing that will secure them this peace deal,” he warned, referencing Russia’s reluctance to return annexed areas of Ukraine. He added that should Ukraine achieve a peace agreement, “it could be a matter of years before the Russians return.”

Conflict re-emerged in the Caucasus even before Russia had concluded its military operations in Chechnya.

In August 2008, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered an offensive against Russian-backed forces in the separatist region of South Ossetia, prompting a swift military response from Moscow, which claimed it aimed to “prevent genocide,” similar to justifications used for its later invasion of Ukraine.

The Russo-Georgian War ended after just five days, not with a comprehensive peace settlement, as advocated by Presidents Trump and Putin for Ukraine, but with a hastily arranged ceasefire known as the Six-Point Plan.

This agreement included provisions to cease hostilities and facilitate humanitarian aid, establishing the official terms to end the conflict.

However, in the years since, experts in Georgia have noted that Moscow has violated key elements of the Six-Point Plan, particularly the fifth point, which stipulated that Russian troops must “withdraw to their positions before hostilities began in South Ossetia.”

Meeting this requirement would necessitate a significant Russian military withdrawal, compromising Moscow’s strategic advantage over Tbilisi.

Shota Utiashvili, who was a senior official at the Georgian Interior Ministry during the conflict, conveyed to The Moscow Times that the Six-Point Plan represented the best possible agreement for Georgia at the time, despite lacking mechanisms to prevent ongoing Russian territorial occupation.

“There weren’t many alternatives available,” Utiashvili noted. “It was evident that the Russians would retain control over the territories they occupied.”

Georgia’s experience was quickly overshadowed by escalating violence in the Donbas and the failure of international agreements to avert Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Currently, U.S. and European officials are advocating for a bilateral summit between Putin and Zelensky as a next step toward peace negotiations to resolve the ongoing conflict.

Utiashvili, who also participated in peace discussions with Russia post-war, indicated that the most significant lesson Georgia’s experience offers now is the necessity for robust security guarantees from Western allies—something Russian officials have already expressed doubts about.

“The critical factor now is not merely the wording of the agreement—if Russia believes it can disregard the agreement without repercussions, it will,” he emphasized. “The vital issue at hand is the strength of security guarantees for Ukraine.”

“The [Ukrainian] populace must be assured that if Russia launches another attack,” he added, “support will arrive, and they will not be left to fend for themselves.”